School District Liability – A New Twist on The Respondeat Superior Doctrine

By editor on January 13, 2025

When is a school district police officer not on duty but on duty? This was the question by a California appellate court (Fourth Dist., Div. One) addressed in Juarez v. San Bernardino City Unified School District, ___ Cal. App.5th ___ (November 25, 2024).

In his lawsuit, Plaintiff Juarez alleges that he found a cell phone on the ground and placed it in his truck. The cellphone belonged to Officer Alejandro Brown, a sworn peace officer and a school district employee. The cell phone had a tracking device, and later that day Officer Brown approached Juarez outside a residence – not at school. Brown was then employed by the school district as a police officer, and he identified himself in that capacity. Brown demanded Juarez turn over the cell phone and pulled his firearm, aiming it at the plaintiff. Juarez retrieved the cellphone from his truck. Officer Brown ordered him to put it on the ground. While Juarez was complying, Officer Brown allegedly struck him in the face with his gun, causing Jaurez to fall back, hit his head and lose consciousness.

A lawsuit followed alleging claims for negligence, battery, assault, negligent hiring and supervision, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress and violation of the Bane Act. The school district filed a demurrer, contending Officer Brown acted outside the course and scope of his employment, since none of the allegations concerned his activity on school premises or during school hours. The trial court sustained the demurrer, leading to an appeal.

On appeal, the school district argued Officer Brown did not act in the course and scope of his employment and had malice toward Juarez. In finding a connection between Brown’s actions and his employment, three alleged facts were critical. First, Brown allegedly used the cell phone to perform his job as a school police officer, and Brown sought to retrieve the phone to perform his job. Second, Juarez alleged that Brown thought his phone was stolen, and he was investigating a possible crime. Third, Juarez also alleged that Brown was investigating a suspected theft and made a false arrest. Fourth, the school district authorized its officers to exercise their peace officer powers anywhere in the state for purposes of performing their primary duty. The district argued Brown was just recovering his cellphone, not attempting to make an arrest.

The appellate court was required to accept the plaintiff-friendly allegations in the complaint as true on demurrer. The facts may well be different, and one can speculate the respondeat superior claim may have a different outcome on summary judgment. The opinion accepted as true the allegations the school district instructed its police officers to exercise their powers as permitted by Penal Code 830.2. (Penal Code 830.2 states in relevant part that a school district police officers “are peace officers whose authority extends to any place in the state for purposes of making an arrest.”) The opinion also does not explain how or when Brown lost the cellphone. It does not mention who paid for the cellphone, or if Brown was reimbursed for the alleged business use of his cellphone.

At the end of the opinion, the court addresses the Bane Act claim. It rejects the district’s argument that school districts are not covered by the Bane Act. The court holds that the Supreme Court’s opinion that the Unruh Act (Civil Code 51) does not apply to a “business establishment” does not apply to the Bane Act (Civil Code 52.1). The applicability of the Bane Act is an important issue, as it usually provides the only vehicle for recovery of attorney’s fees.

In the end, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the court, finding the conduct alleged “may fairly be regarded as an outgrowth of” Officer Brown’s employment with the school district. Therefore, the school district could be potentially liable for the conduct. Schools who employ peace officers should be mindful of this decision.

The appellate court opinion in Juarez can be found here.

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