Ninth Circuit Partially Overturns Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Excessive Force Case
In a recent decision, Spencer v. Aaron Pew, et al., 117 F.4th 1130 (9th Cir. 2024), a Ninth Circuit panel partially overturned a lower court’s ruling granting qualified immunity on Section 1983 claims to four officers involved in a physical struggle with a man during his arrest subsequent to a routine traffic stop.
This case showcases how courts ruling on qualified immunity can break down an incident into separate portions of the timeline/incident and evaluate them independently. It also reasserts key concepts concerning qualified immunity – namely that it is limited to the facts known to the officers during the conduct in question, that a plaintiff’s subjective intentions are irrelevant if they are not shown to have been communicated to the officers during the incident, and that officers need not credit a plaintiff’s statements during an altercation based on the totality of the objective circumstances. Qualified immunity remains an incredibly useful defense given the high bar it places on plaintiffs like Spencer.
In this case, two Mesa (Arizona) Police Department police officers (Ofc. Aaron Pew and Jacob Rozema) conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle for a vehicle code violation. During the traffic stop, Plaintiff Cole Spencer (who was a passenger in the vehicle) appeared nervous and provided officers with a false name. Officers confirmed that Spencer’s appearance did not match the DMV photograph for the name he had provided and asked Spencer to step out of the vehicle. One officer used a control hold and twisted Spencer’s wrist as he stepped out, at which point, Spencer hit that officer with his left shoulder. One of the officers punched Spencer in the face, knocking him to the ground. A three-and-a-half-minute physical struggle ensued.
During the struggle, Ofc. Pew deployed his Taser on Spencer at least four times. Spencer was also punched and kicked in the face by officers several times. Spencer conceded that the officers
instructed him to give up his hands and that he did not do so; however, he claims his hands were “locked up” from the effects of the Taser. Two Maricopa Sheriff’s Office deputies arrived on scene to assist (Deputies Macklin and Shall). Spencer continued to struggle and failed to comply with orders to provide his hands, so additional force was used in an attempt to overcome his resistance (including a stomach punch, knee strikes to the face, Taser stuns to the neck and a carotid control technique). Eventually, officers were able to handcuff Spencer using two sets of handcuffs.
Ofc. Pew got up and placed a knee on Spencer’s upper back while Spencer continued to squirm around on the ground. Spencer told officers, “I can’t breathe. I cannot breathe.” An officer responded by telling him “Ok, well relax!” while another said, “If you’re screaming and fighting, man, you can breathe. You need to calm down.”
Spencer ultimately pleaded guilty to aggravated assault for pushing Ofc. Rozema (injuries to hip/abrasions) before filing his Section 1983 suit. The district court granted summary judgment to Ofcs. Pew and Rozema and MCSO Dep. Macklin based on qualified immunity. It also determined that Dep. Shall did not use any force and concluded there was “no evidence that Dep. Shall had sufficient information from which he could conclude that he should intervene in an excessive use of force.” Plaintiff appealed.
On appeal from the district court decision to grant qualified immunity for the Section 1983 claims, the Ninth Circuit upheld qualified immunity as to the force used by officers to handcuff Spencer based on the “clearly established” second prong of qualified immunity analysis. In doing so, the court highlighted some key concepts concerning qualified immunity.
Because Spencer failed to show either that this is an “obvious case” under the standards of Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) or there is a materially indistinguishable precedent that squarely governs this case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the arrest and handcuffing to be lawful. The Court emphasized that for its analysis, it was the objective actions of Spencer known to officers at the time force was used, and not Spencer’s own subjective intentions (i.e., Spencer’s claims that he had little to no control over his body because he was going in and out of “lock up” when being tased and that any of his voluntary movements were merely to block officers’ punches), that were relevant. Further, the Court acknowledged that even if Spencer did tell the officers that his hands were locked up (as he claimed to have done during the struggle), the officers were not required to “unduly credit” Spencer’s claim that he was physically unable to comply.
The Ninth Circuit concluded, however, that Ofc. Pew’s forceful kneeing on the plaintiff’s back, after he was handcuffed and on the ground, raised a genuine issue of fact as to qualified immunity. As such, those actions remain for the jury to decide the qualified immunity defense.
You can find the case here
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